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NOTES AND COMMENT
by every man and that the same should at least be expected of a
trustee.
It has been decided that this duty of prophecy is satisfied if the
trustee "merely did as hundreds of thousands of other ordinarily pru-
dent and cautious persons did" 57 and even though "most men of that
degree of prudence and caution that we call ordinary did not fore-
see" 58 the "financial cataclysm," the courts cannot harshly condemn
them.
ARTHUR S. MARGULIS.
DUAL OFFICE HOLDING--FEDERAL, STATE AND MUNICIPAL.
It is a fundamental principle of the law of government that
under certain circumstances a person may not simultaneously hold
two governmental offices. The rule had its origin in the common
law, and has been reiterated and extended by constitutional provi-
sions, statutory enactment and executive order. The common law
rule pertaining to dual office holding is that the acceptance by a
public officer of a second incompatible office terminates per se the
ability of the acceptor to hold the first office as effectively as would
a resignation therefrom.I The theory of incompatibility underlying
the common law rule is set forth in People ex rel. Ryan v. Green
as follows:
"Incompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the
functions of the two; as judge and clerk of the same court-
officer who presents his personal accounts subject to audit,
and officer whose duty it is to audit it. * * * The force of the
word in its application to this matter is, that from the nature
and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not
to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antag-
onism which would result in the attempt by one person to
faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one toward
the incumbent of the other." 2
Whether the offices involved are incompatible is a judicial ques-
tion,3 and the true test to be applied is whether the two offices are
"lin re Pettigrew's Estate, 115 N. J. Eq. 401, 171 Atl. 152 (1934).
'In re Westfield Trust Co., mspra note 21.
'Millard v. Thatcher, 2 T. R. 81, English Rul. Cas. 320 (1787); Rex v.
Patteson, 4 B. & A. D. 9 (1832); State v. Bus, 135 Mo. 325, 36 S. W. 636
(1896) ; Oliver v. Jersey City, 63 N. J. L. 96, 42 Atl. 782 (1899) ; State v.
Brinkerhoff, 66 Tex. 45, 17 S. W. 109 (1886); MEcHEM, THE LAW OF OFFICES
AND OFFICERS (1890) §420.
2 People ex rel. Ryan v. Green, 58 N. Y. 295, 304 (1874).
3 Ibid.
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incompatible in their natures, in their rights, or in the duties or obli-
gations connected with, or flowing from them.4  The same person
may hold different offices if they are not incompatible, unless forbid-
den by constitutional or statutory prohibition, 5 and the mere appoint-
ment of a person to a second incompatible office does not ipso facto
nullify his incumbency, but upon qualifying and accepting the second,
the first office is ipso facto vacated.6
The provisions of the constitutions of the various states and of
the Federal Government cover substantially the same ground as the
common law prohibition against holding incompatible offices; but they
also, in many cases, go further than that and arbitrarily prohibit the
holding of two offices which the common law might not declare
incompatible.7 However, where there is a provision that a person
holding one office shall be ineligible to election to another, it follows
that any attempted election to the second is void, and that if, by
reason of it, he attempts to hold the second office he will be removed
from it.8 But, where it is the holding of two offices at the same time
that is forbidden by a constitution or a statute, a statutory incompati-
bility is created, similar in its effect to that of the common law, and,
as in the case of the latter, it is well settled that the acceptance of a
second office of the kind prohibited, operates ipso facto to vacate the
first.9
Whether the right to hold two offices is questioned on the com-
mon law rule of incompatibility or on the ground of statutory restric-
tions, it is often necessary to determine whether the performance of
certain services or the duties involved in a particular position consti-
tutes "holding an office" or whether it is a mere "employment," i. e.
whether a given person is a true office holder or a mere employee.
This distinction is not always easy to make, as Chief Justice Marshall
said:
"Although an office is an employment, it does not follow that
every employment is an office. A man may be certainly
employed under a contract express or implied to do an act
or perform a service without becoming an officer. But if the
duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rule prescribed
by government, and not by contract, which an individual is
appointed to perform, who enters upon the duties appertaining
'State ex rel. Thompson, 20 N. J. L. 689 (1846).
'Badeau v. United States, 130 U. S. 439, 9 Sup. Ct. 579 (1889) ; Converse
v. United States, 62 U. S. 463 (1858).
'People v. Corrique, 2 Hill 93 (N. Y. 1841) (thus acceptance of the office
of town clerk by the justice of the peace vacates the latter) ; People v. Dillon,
38 App. Div. 539, 56 N. Y. Supp. 416 (1899).
12 MEcHEM, op. cit. supra note 1, §427.
8 Id. §428.
1 People v. Brooklyn, 77 N. Y. 503 (1879) ; State v. Draper, 45 Mo. 355
(1871) ; Dickson v. People, 17 Ill. 191 (1855). Contra: McWilliams v. Neal,
130 Ga. 733, 61 S. E. 721 (1908).
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to his station, without any contract defining them, if these
duties continue though the person be changed, it seems very
difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an
office or the person who performs the duties from an officer." 10
An office is a public charge or employment if it be one in which
the public is interested."1 A public officer is one who is appointed
to discharge a public duty and receive a compensation for the same.12
A person holds a public office where he is required to discharge
duties, not for his own benefit or for private individuals, but for the
public.' 3 But a person whose duties are occasional and intermittent,
who is required to keep no place of business as for public use and
who owes no duty to the public, is not a public officer.' 4 The defini-
tion of the term "officer of the United States" was considered by the
Supreme Court in the cases of United States v. Gernwine and United
States v. Movat.15 In the latter case the Court said:
"Unless a person in the service of the Government, therefore,
holds his place by virtue of an appointment by the President,
or of one of the courts of justice or heads of Departments
authorized by law to make such an appointment, he is not,
strictly speaking, an officer of the United States." 16
However, definitions are at best guides; and whether or not a par-
ticular position constitutes an office and the incumbent an officer is
frequently a question of fact."
As has been indicated, the common law rule as to dual office
holding has been supplemented by constitutional and statutory enact-
ments, both federal and state. The framers of the Constitution of
the United States deemed it necessary to extend the common law
restrictions in this respect, in so far as members of Congress are
concerned, by providing that:
"No senator or representative shall, during the Time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under
'0 United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock 96, 102, 103, 26 Fed. Cas. 1211 (1823);
see THROAP, PUB. OFF. §3 et seq.
People v. Brooklyn, 77 N. Y. 503 (1879).
' Connor v. New York, 2 Sandf. 255 (N. Y. 1849).
" People v. Board of Canvassers, 129 N. Y. 36, 29 N. E. 345 (1891).
" People ex reL. Rooney v. Warner, 104 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1907).
'eUnited States v. Germaine, 99 U. S. 508 (1878); United States v.
Movat, 124 U. S. 303 (1888).
"See also United States v. Hartwell, 73 U. S. 385 (1867).
"'Various illustrations of what are offices within the meaning of law
forbidding the holding of two offices: Crovatt v. Mason, 101 Ga. 246, 28 S. E.
891 (1897); People v. Drake, 43 App. Div. 325, aff'd, 161 N. Y. 642, 57 N. E.
1122 (19001; what are not offices: Goodloe v. Fox, 96 Ky. 627, 29 S. W. 443(1895); Olmstead v. New York, 42 N. Y. Super. Ct. 481 (1877); Doyle v.
Raleigh, 89 N. C. 133, 45 Am. Rep. 677 (1883); see SEN. REP. No. 563, 67th
Cong., 2d Sess.
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the Authority of the United States which shall have been
created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased
during such time; and no Person holding any Office under
the United States shall be a Member of either House during
his Continuance in Office." 18
In pursuance of this provision members of Congress have had their
seats declared vacant for accepting commissions as officers of the
volunteer and regular army forces of the United States.19 However,
this is not a problem for the courts, for though essentially a judicial
function, the conclusive determination as to whether the constitutional
qualifications for membership have been met is, by the Constitution,
placed in the hands of each of the two Houses of Congress. 20 An
interesting incident occurred in connection with President Taft's
appointment of Senator Philander -C. Knox as Secretary of State.
In 1909 when the President-elect indicated that he intended to nomi-
nate Senator Knox as Secretary of State, it was pointed out that the
latter was constitutionally ineligible, since the salary of the Secretary's
office had been increased by a law passed while Knox was a senator.
In order to render Senator Knox eligible to the Secretaryship an act
was passed by Congress reducing the salary in question to that which
it had been before the increase mentioned. 21
' U. S. CONST. Art. I, §6. FANsILL, DOCUMENTS OF THE FORMATION OF
THE UNITED STATES, 657-659. In debates in reference to the adoption of what
is now Art. I, §6 of the United States Constitution, the members of the
convention seeking to have it embodied, argued that, without it the acceptance
of a seat in Congress would be utilized by members as a means to an end
rather than an end itself, i. e. members whose political ambitions extended
beyond congressional activities, instead of exerting their faculties solely and
wholly with the problems before the Houses and instead of acting in their own
discretion, might be persuaded in their selections by the lure of patronage from
the Executive. Another argument, advanced in furtherance of the adoption of
the proposed provision coincident with the prior statements was to the effect
that the Executive would have the unlimited power of controlling the vote of
Congress by using his right of appointment to curry favor among insurgent
members whose political policies were at odds with his own. The remarkable
foresight and logic displayed advanced in these theories must have swept away
all opposition, as is evidenced by the adoption of the rule as a provision of
the Constitution. It is worthy to note that although the common law rule as
regards incompatible offices was advanced for the purpose of limiting the
provision, the members to effectuate their purpose decided that a mere adoption
of the common law rule would be inadequate, and went beyond it.
See also Art. 2, §1 of the Constitution which provides that "Each state
shall appoint in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number
of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Represen-
tative, or Person holding an office of Trust of Profit under the United States
shall be appointed an Elector."
"S 1 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) §338.
A state office does not disqualify for membership.
Id. §340; U. S. CONST. Art. I, §4, cl. 1.
21 1 WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 19.
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The United States Congress, feeling that the prohibition against
dual office holding should be extended to office holders other than
members of Congress, has by statutory enactment further provided
that:
"No person who holds an office, the salary or annual compen-
sation attached to which amounts to the sum of twenty-five
hundred dollars shall be appointed to or hold any other office
to which compensation is attached unless specially authorized
thereto by law." 22
Prior to the passage of this Act there was no legal objection to the
same person holding more than one office and receiving the fees
earned by discharging the functions of both.2 3 However, this section,
applying by its terms to offices to which a fixed salary of at least
twenty-five hundred dollars is attached, has been held to be inappli-
cable where the compensation is less. Thus, it does not prevent a
clerk of the circuit court from holding the office of commissioner of
such court.24
The problem of dual office holding has also been dealt with by
the Presidents through Executive Orders. In January, 1873, Presi-
dent Grant issued an Executive Order which provided that, except
as to certain minor offices such as justices of the peace and notaries
public, the acceptance by federal officers of state or territorial offices
would be deemed to vacate the federal offices held by them, and to
operate as a resignation from such offices by such federal officals. 25
By Executive Order of May, 1927, President Coolidge modified the
Executive Order of President Grant by the addition of a paragraph
providing that any state, county or municipal officer might be
appointed as prohibition officer of the Treasury Department to enforce
the provisions of the National Prohibition Act, except in those states
having constitutional and statutory provisions against state officers
holding office under the Federal Government. More recent Execu-
tive Orders have limited further the Executive Order of President
Grant. In 1933 President Roosevelt exempted Raymond Moley,
Assistant Secretary of State, therefrom in order to permit him to
hold the position of a member of the committee to collect facts
relating to the present administration of justice in New York State
(Commission on the Administration of Justice in New York State) .2 0
By another Order he appointed the following persons, who were then
already holding the positions indicated, to serve, without additional
compensation, as members of the National Youth Administration:
'28 STAT. 205, c. 174, §2 (1894); 43 STAT. 245, c. 214 (1924); U. S. C.
A., tit. 5, §62.
'United States v. McCandless, 147 U. S. 692, 13 Sup. Ct. 465 (1893).
"United States v. Durlacher, 63 Fed. 672 (1894).
See also Executive Orders of June 26, 1907 and April 14, 1917.
Executive Order No. 6108, April 12, 1933.
1935 ]
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Arthur J. Altmeyer, Second Assistant Secretary; John Studebaker,
Commissioner of Education; M. L. Wilson, Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture; Lee Pressman, General Counsel, Resettlement Admin-
istration; Chester H. McCall, Special Assistant to Secretary of
Commerce.2 7
In many states the common law prohibition concerning dual
office holding is supplemented by constitutional and statutory provi-
sions.28  New York has treated the subject both in its constitution
and in statutes of limited application.2 9 The New York State con-
stitution provides :
"No member of the Legislature shall receive any civil appoint-
ment within this State, or the Senate of the United States,
from the Governor, the Governor and the Senate, or from the
Legislature, or from any city government, during the time for
which he shall have been elected; and all such appointments
and all votes given for any such member for any such office or
appointment shall be void." 3 0
This provision was interpreted by the court in Stewart v. Mayor of
New York,3' where it was held that the appointment of plaintiff,
while a member of the assembly, to the office of clerk of a district
court was valid; the prohibition is not absolute as appears from the
qualifying words which limit the appointments to those received
from the governor, governor and senate, or from the legislature, or
from any city government. A civil appointment coming from any
other source than is named in the section would therefore be valid.
The court added:
"The evil which the amendment [above cited constitutional
provision] sought to remedy and prevent was the corruption
of the appointing power of the Member of the Assembly,
rather than to exclude the Member of Assembly from par-
ticipation in the civil service of the state; and the reason
appears quite plain in the fact that between the several sources
'Executive Order No. 7096, July 9, 1935.
'2 Long v. Rose, 132 Ga. 228, 64 S. E. 84 (1909) ; People v. Blake, 144 Ill.
App. 246 (1908) ; State v. Carroll, 57 Wash. 202, 106 Pac. 748 (1910).
'For example, §19 of the New York Second Class Cities Law, providing
that "no person shall, at the same time, bold more than one city office" and
that "upon the acceptance by a city officer of a second office the office first
held by him becomes vacant" applies only to cities of the second class (id. §2).
See also N. Y. Villag Law §42; N. Y. Civil Service Law §3. The general
statute prescribing when an office becomes vacant includes no reference to dual
office holding (N. Y. Pub. Off. Law §30).
'o N. Y. STATE CONST. art. III, §7.
'Stewart v. Mayor of New York, 15 App. Div. 548 (1897) ; see Whitmore
v. Mayor, 5 Hun 195, 67 N. Y. 21 (1876) ; People ex rel. Gilchrist v. Murray,
73 N. Y. 535 (1878).
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of the power of appointment mentioned in the Constitution
and a Member of the Assembly there exists a relation by
which one or the other might be influenced in their official
action."
By another provision of the New York Constitution the eligi-
bility of those elected to the legislature in respect to offices previously
held, is defined . 2
The New York State Constitution also prohibits judges of the
Court of Appeals and the justices of the Supreme Court from hold-
ing any other public office or trust.33 In the case of Connolly v.
Scudder 34 the Court of Appeals in an interpretation of this provi-
= Article III, §8 of the NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION provides that
"No person shall be eligible to the Legislature who at the time of his election,
is, or within one hundred days previous thereto, has been, a member of Con-
gress, a civil or military officer under the United States, or an officer under
any city government. And if any person shall, after his election as a member
of the Legislature, be elected to Congress or appointed to any office, civil or
military, under the government of the United States, or under any city govern-
ment, his acceptance thereof shall vacate his seat."
A New York national guard officer is eligible to the legislature within the
meaning of this section since he is an officer appointed by the state and cannot
be regarded as a military officer under the United States for the purpose of
questioning his eligibility. Op. Atty. Geri. (1919), 21 St. Dept. Rep. 276.
An officer of the Federal Reserve Corps not in active service is not a military
officer within the meaning of this section. Matter of Flynn, 203 App. Div.
839, 196 N. Y. Supp. 926 (1932).
In People ex rel. Sherwood v. Board of Canvassers, 129 N. Y. 360 (1891),
the question was whether a member of the park commission of Hornellsville
was an officer under any city government, and, therefore, ineligible under this
section to election as a state senator. The commission had been created by
act of the legislature, and the general character of its relationship to the city
government was in many respects similar to that of the educational authorities
in New York City to the city government. In holding that the relator was an
officer under the city government the court said:
"It is no answer to these views that the power and duties of these
commissioners are regulated by law, and thus that they do not act under
the direction or control of the city government or any of its officers, and
that, therefore, they are in a certain sense, independent officers. This is
generally true of all public officers, from the mayor of a city to the
supervisor of a town and through all the grades to a town constable."
The fact that education is a state function does not make an educational officer
a state officer. Matter of Hirschfield v. Cook, 227 N. Y. 297, 125 N. E. 504
(1919) ; Lewis v. Board of Education of City of New York, 258 N. Y. 117,
179 N. E. 315 (1932).
'CONSTITUTION OF NEW YORK, art. VI, §19 provides:
"The Judges of the Court of Appeals and justices of the Supreme Court
shall not hold any other public office or trust, except that they shall be
eligible to serve as members of a constitutional convention."
Connolly v. Scudder, 247 N. Y. 401, 160 N. E. 655 (1928); cited in
People v. Tremaine, 252 N. Y. 27, 168 N. E. 817 (1929).
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sion 3 5 held that an acceptance by a Supreme Court justice of an
appointment by the Governor as commissioner in removal proceedings
under Section 34 of the Public Officers Law "is acceptance of a
public trust within the prohibition of section 19 of Article 6 of the
State Constitution and thus the appointment was invalid." It should
be noted, however, that the court did not declare that the justice
vacated his first office upon acceptance of the second, but held that
he could not hold the second office. This decision would seem to be
irreconcilable with the common law rule and a deviation from it were
it not for the words of the court to the effect that:
"Equivocal acts will be so interpreted as to escape a violation
of the Constitutional command, and even the risk of violation
when conduct, though permissible, is close to the line of dan-
ger. Here the acts are not equivocal. Nothing has been said
and nothing has been done with the will to serve in any other
capacity than that of a justice of the court."
In other words the court held that since the Justice of the Supreme
Court did not intend to accept a new office but believed that he was
merely carrying out his office as a justice, he would not be consid-
ered as having abandoned his first office for the second.
The Greater New York Charter,3 6 Section 1549, creates a statu-
tory incompatibility between federal offices and city offices, between
state offices and city offices, and between any two offices connected
with or under the city government. In Huibert v. Craig,37 the peti-
tioner, while president of the Board of Alderman of New York City,
was appointed by the governor of New York as a member of the
Finger Lakes State Park Commission. The respondent, comptroller
of the City of New York, refused to pay the petitioner his salary
as Board president on the ground that under the said section he
instantly vacated his city office. The court, in sustaining the position
taken by the comptroller, held that on any construction of the section,
the petitioner had vacated the office of president of the Board of
Aldermen. Justice Proskauer, writing in the lower court the opinion
which was affirmed on appeal, said:
"I am keenly aware of the hardship worked by this conclusion.
By accepting membership on this commission petitioner
assumed a public duty which brought no gain to him. He
acted unselfishly and with public spirit, but the drastic man-
date of the Greater New York Charter, Section 1549, permits
the court to be affected by no such consideration. It reserves
'Supra note 33.
' N. Y. Laws of 1917, c. 466 as amended.
' Hulbert v. Craig, 124 Misc. 273, aff'd, 241 N. Y. 525, 150 N. E. 539
(1925).
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for the city the undivided public service of its officers. It is
self executing. When an officer transgresses its provisions
he shall be deemed thereby to have vacated his city office."
Petitioner contended that although he vacated the office, he was
entitled to salary as a de facto officer, since he performed its duties.
There is some support for this contention in dicta and decisions,38
but the overwhelming weight of authority in other jurisdictions is
against it.39 In a later case, Metzger v. Swift,"' the court also upheld
the drastic provision of Section 1549. This was a taxpayers' action
to restrain the payment of salary to the defendant, Swift, a member
of the Board of Health of the City of New York. At the time
Swift was appointed a member of the Board of Health he was a
trustee of Hunter College, a member of the Board of Higher Educa-
tion of the City of New York and a member of Hunter College
Retirement Board, and these offices he retained or attempted to retain
after his appointment to the Board of Health. The Appellate Divi-
sion held that "the effect of his assumption of the new office was not
merely a forfeiture of the old one, but a forfeiture of the new one
too." The offices occupied by Swift were connected with the govern-
ment of the City of New York. Education is a state or governmen-
tal function. This does not mean that one fulfilling such a function
is invariably a state as distinguished from a city officer.4' The names
of the departments of the city government in the table of contents
of the Charter show that the function of many of them are state and
governmental as well as municipal and local. However, the Court
of Appeals modified the determination of the Appellate Division, and
ruled that the result of the acceptance by Swift of the new office of
member of the Board of Health was to terminate his tenure of the
offices previously held, but that he was nevertheless entitled to retain
the new position.
The importance of this statute can best be appreciated when it is
'Reynolds v. McWilliams, 49 Ala. 552 (1873); Behan v. Davis, 3 Ariz.
399 (1892).
'Bennett v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 379 (1884); Dolan v. Mayor, 68
N. Y. 274 (1872).
In the latter case the court said:
"It is the settled doctrine in this State, that the right to the salary and
emoluments of a public office, attach to the true and not to the mere
colorable title, and in an action brought by a person claiming to be a
public officer for the fees or compensation given by law, his title to the
office is in issue, and if that is defective and another has the real right,
although not in possession, the plaintiff cannot recover. Actual incum-
bency merely gives no right to the salary or compensation."
40 Metzger v. Swift, 258 N. Y. 440, 180 N. E. 112 (1932).
'
1 Lewis v. Board of Education, 258 N. Y. 117, 179 N. E. 315 (1932);
Matter of Hirschfield v. Cook, 227 N. Y. 297, 125 N. E. 504 (1919) cited in
note 32, supra.
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realized that both the legislature and the -courts have recently found
it necessary to limit its operation in specific instances. The legisla-
ture, realizing the far-reaching mandate of the section, passed as an
emergency measure an act amending the Charter of the City of New
York in order to allow Robert Moses, an unsalaried State Park
Commissioner, to accept the appointment of Commissioner of Parks
of New York City, and also to allow him to accept any other unsal-
aried office filled by appointment of the Mayor of New York.42
Even the position of Mayor of New York is not beyond the
reach of this statute. In July of this year, a case was reported
wherein Mayor La Guardia placed his position in jeopardy by accept-
ing an appointment to the President's Advisory Committee on Allot-
ments, which committee was established by the President for the
purpose of obtaining advice on the allotment of funds for public
works. The court held that a member of this Advisory Committee
is not a person who holds a "civil office of honor, trust or emolument
under the government of the United States," within the meaning of
Section 1549.43 This was clearly a decision of expediency, and the
court has not bound itself to any rule of the applicability of the
statute to presidential appointments in general. It does serve, how-
ever, as does the legislative exception mentioned, as an excellent
illustration of the occasional need for relaxing the strict interpreta-
tion of such a prohibitory statute of general application.
Considering and analyzing the subject of dual office holding in
its entirety, it is apparent that, notwithstanding the various provisions
embodied in the Constitutions of the United States and of New York
State and miscellaneous statutes and laws, the common law rule is
still in force. Where in a particular case no statute concerning dual
office holding applies, the test of the common law rule must still be
applied and satisfied; that is, that the positions must not be incom-
patible, if the officer is to retain both positions.
It further seems well established that while both the common
law rule and the constitutional and statutory extensions thereof are
unquestionably founded on sound public policy, the rules, if literally
applied, occasionally work not only a hardship on the individuals
concerned but also react detrimentally to the public they are designed
to protect. It might be that some discretion in their application
could be expressly given to the courts; but this would in all probabil-
ity only make for uncertainty and increased litigation. Where hard-
ship is imposed by a technical construction of the law, as in Hulbert
v. Craig,44 it must be accepted rather as a manifestation of justice to
the many than of injustice to the individual.
JOSEPH F. BARBANO.
' N. Y. Laws of 1934, c. 2, §607.
" N. Y. L. J., July 2, 1935, p. 13.
"Supra note 37.
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